

---

**Author** Research Professor David Arellano-Gault \*

**Title** An organizational analysis of transparency: "transparency failures" as an instrument for incorporating effective transparency policies into public organizations.

**Volume 4 issue 1**

---

### **Abstract**

The discussion over the requirement for openness of governmental information is part of a much larger debate: transparency as a general principle in democratic societies. There is no doubt that in several countries, significant inroads have been made into this area. However, this debate is often based on a kind of hope which is poorly supported theoretically and analytically. Giving actual content to the social concept of "transparency" seems to be a critical step toward more important and practical agendas, such as its effective implementation and inclusion into governmental organizations. This paper proposes four "transparency failures" as tools to study concrete and workable ways of incorporating the transparency agenda into governmental organizations.

**Key Words** Transparency, Access to Governmental Information, Organization Theory, Governmental Organizations, Implementation.

1. Limitations to the economist vision of transparency

Transparency in government action has turned into a fundamental mechanism for building democratic societies. Nevertheless, it is also a trend which can become somewhat intangible if it is not dealt with in a valorative way and therefore instrumentally, with care. For example, it goes without saying that the consequences of implementing policies that provide for transparency of

information in public organizations, in their structures and procedures, are profound. If it is necessary to express the need for an open and democratic society in order to gain access to information, it is equally as important to understand that organizational impact is very broad and not always positive. In other terms, introducing criteria that provide for transparency always implies the potential for generating undesired consequences in organizational and institutional behavior (Fung et al, 2007, 25). The transformation of social and organizational behavior both within organizations and outside them is one of the most difficult social engineering projects (Wildavsky, 1993:3). Undesired consequences and counterintuitive side effects are part and parcel of philosophies like transparency which often surfaces as a naïve rhetoric without stopping to consider that these types of reforms require caution, patience, perseverance and a great deal of political will to support them and make them effective (see the case of UK for example, Roberts, 2006: 114).

Transparency of governmental information is necessary and indispensable in any democracy. When we refer to the consequences that these information policies bring to organizations we can see that the reasons behind this statement may be varied. The prevailing viewpoint in the literature in respect to the way governments act nowadays stems from the assertion that bureaucracies and politicians are actors that defend their own interests and need specific incentives to behave in a positive way, in other words, to the benefit of the collective. Taking the different statements of this type fashioned from the so-called New Economy (Menard, 2001) and the theory of rational choice (Buchanan, 1986) as a starting point, governmental organizations are seen as bastions of power proprietary to bureaucracies with political interests which would defend their budget and advantage over information with every means available (Downs, 1967; Niskanen, 1971). Organizational change and reform strategies (such as

transparency of information policies) are (from a point of view that we could label economist) exogenous tactics to impact an organization, designed by apparently disinterested actors which impose incentives (both negative and positive) for the purpose of aligning the interests of the bureaucracy with those of society. Oversight and punishment then become important instruments, mechanisms used by external authorities over organizations, which together with neutral (or "citizen's") criteria impose this oversight over the actors and their behavior.

This extreme perspective on governmental organizations has brought various advantages to the analysis and design of information policies, but also a number of disadvantages. The recovery of the political factor within public administration has been a step forward. Ultimately, the idea of the politics/administration dichotomy is in many ways unsustainable, making it vital to understand that political factors form an indispensable part of administrative action. But it is curious that this economist standpoint has given rise to remedies that seek to reedit this dichotomy: the solution must come from outside, imposing external incentives together with constant oversight of seemingly depoliticized actors. The economist perspective then sees governmental organizations as aggregates of calculating and ever opportunistic individuals imbedded within power mechanisms that only obey when under threat or fear of punishment (or possibly on the promise of certain positive incentives). It assumes, moreover, that the actors charged with this oversight and the production of incentives will be apolitical (or at least technically "neutral", due to their professionalism, such as in the case of autonomous technical organizations, or because they are "citizens" without any apparent political ties), and that the game is one of constant oversight and ongoing conflict.

Thus, transparency and the policies that spring up in its name must have value and substance, in addition to a profound pragmatic vision with a commitment to its limitations, otherwise, it is likely to become overloaded, over full of common ground and therefore, paradoxically hollow. Let us analyze this a little more carefully by looking at some lessons on organization theory. It is widely known that individuals cannot be completely transparent, even if they wanted to be. Human behavior is broadly based on uncertainty in respect to what other actors may do and how they might react. Weber (1974) called this "the sense of action". Part of human freedom lies in this uncertainty of action (Crozier, 1964). We must take great care that our notion of transparency does not lose sight of the fact that it is an instrument of human action, that human beings on principle maintain an air or degree of freedom which ultimately makes us unpredictable, turning us into actors capable of change and of learning. In summary, the possible "sense" of human action is many and heterogeneous. The theory behind liberal politics comes from a similar principle: there is no single concrete definition of the "good life". There are as many definitions of the good life as there are individuals, and any liberal and democratic society must protect the right of each and every person to define this for themselves. The desire to impose specific criteria over others is a source of totalitarianism. It is essential therefore that our concept of transparency of governmental information be used to sustain liberal society, and not to impose any concrete criteria over the belief that there is only one way of defining social values in general, or that we possess the only correct option.

The basic concept of contemporary organization and economic theory comes in many ways from the notion of bounded rationality as defined by Simon (1947). This concept warns us that individuals are not fully rational as it is next to impossible that humans possess computational resources needed to consider

every alternative and consequence of their actions. As a result, humans make decisions based on incomplete information, which is costly, and an infinite price cannot be paid to obtain it all. Human rationality therefore, is not a never ending search to eliminate uncertainty (a vain purpose in a plural and liberal world), but an evasion or avoidance of this uncertainty. To Simon, rationality implies the following argument; actors are rational, strategic and valorative. From this "Simononian" point of view, we are able to speculate that transparency is the search to improve communication, to develop a positive psychological (organizational) environment toward openness, mutual oversight and the building of trust. Elster (1983) went as far as to show that excess information may result in actors making the wrong decisions due to the paralyzing effect of the complexity of alternatives to consider. Excess information may also cause great difficulty for actors to reach an agreement; this is because negotiation often starts with agreements over certain points in a dispute that are not critical, but which are a step forward nonetheless. In all complex social relationships, individuals agree to establish *precommitment* criteria, since uncertainty pushes them into accepting certain limitations and lines of action and relation (Elster, 1979). From the comments made by Elster we may say that *precommitments* are not always based on more information, but on an agreement about how to treat it, and on which mutual commitments are accepted between different actors. Efforts to ensure negotiation is always at the heart of any argument and may even lead to it being rejected; to speak about transparency of information without context is to gamble on a vague concept which makes little sense to actors, individuals and society.

Organizations are entities of collective action made up of a wide variety of individuals with bound rationality, which negotiate. When we speak of democracy and governmental and public organizations, we are also talking of

organizations in the context of liberal societies which must protect diversity and fairness in an unequal society and with individuals whose concept of the good life is different. From this perspective, which we could label organizational/institutional, the actors (including here both the bureaucracies as well as the “overseers”) are effectively political, but also highly valorative: not only do they pursue their interests narrow-mindedly, but they are also capable of seeking and finding sense (Weick, 2000) in a wide variety of values and decisions. They can and must build sense within a limited information framework where strategic action, and oversight and control are just two of the instruments available to the task of constructing meaningful collective action; in other words, where actors give and have built explanations of the reasons and *reasonableness* of the policies or political and organizational decisions.

In this institutional/organizational vision, building up a policy of transparency requires an understanding that organizational actors, and by this of course we also include governmental organizations, basically build a variety of different mechanisms to defend their interests; however, they are also capable of building sense into action as a basic strategy for providing a reason and logic to it. The simplicity of the economist model is overtaken by the evidence that human action always, albeit ubiquitously, faces up to the uncertainty, ambiguity, or incompleteness of information. From this point of view, transparency is a conceptual construct that loses all value if it is emptied of content: no human action may be transparent in the purest sense of the term; this individual, group or organizational crystal box does not exist, much less one that is clearly linked to a series of objectives that provide sense which is socially and institutionally legitimate.

A notion of transparency of organizational information which is not overburdened, assuming that this is a social and organizational instrument for making better decisions, reducing the potential for corruption, and increasing the prospects for trust and cooperation in a plural society, is neither a universal or general value (which supposes the more transparency the better since there is no single way to define it), or a monolithic instrument without cost or limitation (in other words, that there is a common mindset or body that possesses the perfect, technical instrument to define transparency once and for all, and for everyone).

It is accepted then that transparency is a concept and practice that creates tension within organizations wherever implemented: a) it is a costly policy that requires constant adjustment and continuous oversight not only of those involved, but of the oversees as well; b) it may reduce efficiency over the short term (with the hope, but never the certainty that this will increase over the long term); c) it creates new strategic games in the struggle to find advantage in a more open competition or where information takes on new meaning as a political instrument for attack and counterattack; d) it may give rise to virtuosos cycles of oversight and control, which often prove detrimental in terms of meaning and trust.

So once more we are faced with the advantages and disadvantages, which are probably better explained as logical tensions in the face of social constructs, such as transparency, and imply constant confrontation and strain in a more open strategic game that employs new instruments (for a more detailed analysis see Arellano-Gault, 2005: 52). Building a more realistic and somewhat less rhetorical concept of transparency is a necessity for the purpose of constructing

more effective instruments that allow organizations and their members to incorporate a sense of logic and collective meaning of policies of transparency.

## 2. Building transparency within organizations: from a transparency failure approach

Giving practical content to transparency as an organizational policy implies understanding from the outset, the multiple tensions it generates. Organizations, as spaces of collective action in a context of costly information and bound rationality, must build mechanisms of sense, association, and of integration. Transparency, moreover, cannot escape this dynamic; no concept may permeate into the collective conscience of an organization (much less a political logic such as that found in governmental organizations) as a simple instrument that is immediately adopted into the organizational hardware. It must be interpreted, incorporated in to the relationship mechanisms between groups and individuals, which rationalize and make is more reasonable in the eyes of the values and standards of organizational action. It is also interpreted politically and adjusted to fit the political weave of groups and their networks.

While it is certainly true that transparency must be generic with both self and external oversight, it must be understood as just one step in a particular political dynamic. Effective incorporation of transparency requires that it be introduced organizationally, and not just through regulation.

To achieve this it may be more useful to start the discussion from a "second level", if one can put it this way. A first level notion of transparency of information labels it as a generic and abstract concept: to be transparent, similar to the heroic and impossible conditions of rational vision, is to offer all

available information at any time to any actor who requires it. A “first level” view of transparency of information would demand, through illusory discourse that the goal is to make human and organizational relationships between individuals transparent. Even the different authors that advocate an economist viewpoint understand that all information is costly, and that it is impossible for human action to be fully transparent (Williamson, 1991). Ambiguity is ubiquitous, and forms part of the framework of relationships and instruments employed by actors that seek freedom, to resist power, innovate and strive to change the status quo.

A “second level” view of transparency of information would imply recognizing it as a specific, restrictive, or limited instrument for improving relationships and communication between plural actors in a democratic setting (in other words, discord, valorative plurality, bound rationality). Therefore, it is a costly instrument that must be adapted carefully if the desired outcome is to improve political and social relationships through a complex combination and balance of trust and oversight, regulation and *self-compliance*, supervision and punishment, and generation of the capacity of organizations to *internalize* transparency as a value agreed upon between actors. For this reason it seems more practical and realistic to begin with a concept of transparency that understands its own instrumentality, in other words, its bias as a value and as a strategy, and the fact it will be incorporated and interpreted in multitude of ways into the variety of different organizations.

What happens to concepts that seek to become generic within organizations (such as efficiency or communication) is that, ultimately, if we want them to be effective, they are set out as CRITERIA, and not as universal or regulatory values. These criteria build “common denominators” or in other words, bases

over which to compare and place different actions or rules under the microscope. An action or regulation may become “effective” in a given context or for certain actors, but not for others. It depends on how they are compared, and for this, common denominators are important. The example of efficiency is interesting: an action is efficient if it meets the criteria of achieving maximum results for the resources given or employs a minimum of resources to accomplish certain outcomes. Efficiency is a common denominator since it adapts to multiple types of “results” and “resources”. It may be useful to apply the same logic to transparency of information over values that are understood, to define it as one criteria or collection of criteria, which will change and vary from organization to organization and give it sense. Organizational criteria, as put forward by Simon (1947: 171), change into mechanisms that order the relationships between organizational actors without ever putting aside discussion or negotiation over values (all things considered, values have ethical components that cannot necessarily be reduced to factual arguments).

Therefore, transparency of information as a criteria implies establishing specific frameworks for comparison and measurement of organizational activities for the purpose of setting up parameters that are more or less measurable, and allow organizational actors to calculate the costs and benefits of their interaction, as well as share the sense of the action and the possibility of building new organizational values that give meaning to transparency in an *internalized* way (and not just in response to threat or punishment). Thus, transparency as criteria establishes a series of parameters that are desired in organizational interaction. Sought after, but difficult to attain unless specific effort is made by the actors to incorporate and *internalize* it. In other words, transparency of information in organizational relationships will never be achieved naturally as it reduces the actor’s capacity for strategic action, which in turn diminishes their

margin for maneuvering and manipulation. This space for maneuvering is constantly sought after in organizations, which after all provided for freedom of action (through control of uncertainty, Crozier and Friedberg, 1989). It is for this reason that organizations must build transparency and not just adapt or localize it (all organizational criteria are constructs in some way or another; this includes efficiency and without doubt, transparency as well).

If organizational action is a collection of rational (bound), strategic, valorative and sense-making activities, it is clear that there will be acceptable transparency constructs within an organization, as well as unacceptable (incomprehensible) constructs, or ones that would require that the shared organizational "sense" be reformed in order for it to be acceptable. Creating conditions for identifying spaces where transparency can be built not only implies recognizing the regulatory principles of transparency, but also the mechanisms for actors to make sense of the action and broaden the spectrum of transparency acceptable to the organization.

Consequently, transparency criteria are not just regulations, value-free and universal, but mechanisms for identifying the roots of the sense that enables actors to build transparency systems that are acceptable to organizations (as criteria, they require that each organization agree upon parameters and mechanisms for measuring). Accordingly, we prefer to equate these criteria with "transparency failures" in order to make it perfectly clear that these criteria establish minimal desirable levels of transparency, without assuming *a priori* that there is anything out of the ordinary or wrong with the organization or individuals (somewhat arbitrarily, generically accepting that they must be built and not imposed as universal values). Conceptual comparisons between "transparency failures" and their economic cousins "market failures" and

“governmental failures” seek to establish how “normal” actions of an organization are based on activities and chains of processes and behaviors that may run contrary to transparency criteria, and on the search for other associated phenomenon ranging from opportunistic obscurity (in other words, the strategic use of obscurity to the benefit of a particular actor), to processes rooted in trust or efficiency or simplicity, which may affect transparency of information. In other words, failures in the transparency of information are not necessarily pathological or illnesses in need of treatment, but fully embedded processes that may even be established rationally on order to meet other criteria, such as efficiency, or the search for strategic spaces by certain actors<sup>1</sup>. “Transparency failures” are not necessarily indicative of maquiavelic spaces created by selfish actors with an interest in maintaining the status quo, but instead may be clearly identified as rational, *sense-making* processes; in other words, completely rational chains of action and interpretation on the part of actors within organizations in their given political and organizational context. Consequently, if they are not maladies to be rooted out, the fact that there are numerous paths for building mechanisms to deal with these failures becomes clearer. There is no single recipe for dealing with these failures, nor can they be resolved by discussions over regulation, but through a profound understanding of how sense-making and rationality are interwoven into the fabric of organizations, and the interpretation actors in organizational settings give to certain processes and chains in order to be able to identify ways to transform and make them more transparent.

---

<sup>1</sup> The practical examples are many: an ad hoc decision made in committee and not by general agreement to save time or deal with an emergency; an agreement that is accepted “on principle” while waiting for a more suitable moment, market or political conditions favorable to making it “formal”; a performance agreement based on learning and mutual trust, in view of the complexity of measuring the actual performance of an activity or policy.

Identifying transparency failures would allow us to begin to recognize the chains of processes, regulations, routines, behaviors and interpretations that actors impose over different organizational actions for the purpose of investigating and designing paths that would enable us to build organizational actions as practically as possible aimed at reducing or eliminating these failures.

General criteria for the concept of transparency of information may be understood as those that establish a pattern of common behavior aimed at creating balanced rules for sharing and distributing information both within and outside an organization for the purpose of ensuring that political and organizational agendas are drawn up to give different actors the same opportunities to enter into dialog and interact.

As a result, we can consider the following criteria as fundamental to identifying transparency failures:

a) *Inclusion*, understood as the importance of involving the main actors which affect decision making within organizations. It supposes that there is a transparency failure in the actions or processes of an organization when information is excluded or provided disproportionately with the help of rational criteria and the current processes of the organization.

b) *Publicity*, understood as the requirement to document and publish relevant information about the way an organization makes its decisions. It assumes that there is a *transparency failure* when the documentation of processes is unclear or insufficient, and cannot be justified in terms of efficiency or simplicity, making it difficult to publish data or results.

c) *Verifiability*, understood as the capacity to document and evidence for a reasonable price that the decisions and processes have indeed been carried out

in a specified and defined manner. Therefore, it is understood that there is a *transparency failure* in those processes or actions where it is difficult or impossible to verify the connection between the decisions made and their effective execution.

d) *Responsibility*, understood as the definition of relationships and roles, as well as the precision and documentation, given to procedures assigned to each and every responsible actor that takes part in decision making and the implementation of agreements. Thus, one can expect to see a *transparency failure* in those processes or actions where it is not possible to find a logical or convincing definition of positions and duties, and/or where the specific allocation of relationships between actors and actions is difficult to establish.

There are two advantages to these criteria. On the one hand, they facilitate the identification of spaces in the processes or regulations of an organization where the actions of the organization are visibly affected by the incorporation of transparency criteria. However, it is clear that this has an even greater advantage: it opens up the discussion on the importance of transparency of information, not just as a social value that provides control over governmental decisions, but also as a catalyst for effective organizational change. Transparency then, at this secondary level of discussion where it relinquishes its goal of becoming an end in itself (all transparency is good whereas obscurity is the maquiavelic assault of perverse and opportunistic actors) and is put forward as a criteria, makes it possible to find the reason and to understand the importance of the balance between control and trust in organizations (as seems to be the proposal of Heald, 2006: 30).

As transparency of information is seen more and more as a control mechanism, incorporating this into organizational cultures and realities becomes more

laborious and costly. In practice, the concept of transparency has to be incorporated as a logical piece of organizational action in order to generate trust values and not just control, creating sense, embedded within an organization's routines and internalized within organizational action. As a result, it would be much more logical to incorporate transparency criteria into the normal and current flow of an organization. The process could be as follows: the most important processes of the organization are defined, and to them are applied the notion of transparency failures for the purpose of analyzing how inclusion, publicity, verifiability and responsibility are handled and incorporated into current processes. Carry out a diagnostic to find the answer to this question: why does the current process have these specific failures? Is it opportunistic, or is it because there are powerful actors that benefit from this opacity? Otherwise, is it the result of other criteria such as simplicity, efficiency or the culture of the organization? How then do these failures form part of the meaning, the rational under which the individuals involved in the organization act? Once the organizational framework is understood, decisions can be made in an attempt to involve transparency, and resolve failures through decision making and modifications to the organizational process that is embedded within the organization and not by imposing external remedies. Thus transparency, as a strategy and criteria, in harmony with efficiency, simplicity, organizational culture, might make better sense of the actions of every actor.

In other words, the success of transparency criteria within organizations is measured in terms of the balance between oversight, supervision and trust. Oversight is always costly and imperfect. Self-compliance and self-regulation are important goals to achieve and the concept of transparency must be involved. The tools employed in transparency cannot focus solely on persecution, but on the creation of culturally accepted spaces for improvement.

### 3. Some final thoughts

After reflecting on the failures that transparency may generate, it is clear that the attempts to implement and develop these practices in governmental organizations go way beyond moralistic discussions or the battle between “obscure bureaucrats” and the “defenders of transparency”. The dominant discussion in several countries has been based around the following premise: that public officials and politicians are fundamentally (politically) interested parties and therefore opposed to transparency. It is within their rationality to hide information, and guard it behind a veil of bureaucratic secrecy, given that “obscurity” suits their purposes. The recipe is simple: it involves an epic battle among “society” to open up its public officials and politicians to transparency, for better or for worse. Given that it will always be in their interest to hide information and to be obscure, it will be necessary to create incentives (positive, but above all negative, in other words, threats and punishments), and make it “rational” on the part of the public official or politician not to resist the “light”. Unfortunately, this metaphor taken to its extreme ceases to hold meaning, however clear or useful it may be: no actor is transparent by nature, not even the defenders of this concept, therefore as a society we are permanently trapped in a vicious circle of mistrust, surrounded by a forced transparency as a value that is constantly being eroded.

Although diverse countries have shown much progress in creating the foundations for a more transparent society and government, that is, with the capacity to exchange plural and more open information, important steps need to be taken to develop a more serious and realistic agenda for implementation and incorporation of the principles of transparency into governmental organizations. The social spaces that we call organizations are much more than just blind and

obedient machinery, and the “lack of transparency” is not just an expression of the way actors within organizations systematically resist opening up the information in their possession. Creating an organizational sense of transparency involves much more dynamic elements, where transparency is one of the decision making criteria that organizations possess, in combination with others (such as efficiency and coordination). The way transparency becomes interwoven with an organization, and how it creates meaning and is incorporated together with other organizational values would seem to be the key that will allow us to understand that “transparency failures” are not necessarily errors or deliberate efforts to hide information, but a combination of diverse criteria that are “understood” by actors who give them a particular sense, which is the “correct”, “efficient”, “logical”, “common” or “effective” thing to do.

Even so, transparency policies are indispensable to any democracy. However, it is also true that its cost and incorporation into the political and organizational dynamic must be developed according to principles of reasonableness and not through continual conflict between groups or parties. A policy of transparency can only be successful if it is incorporated into the social and organizational (in its structures and in decision making) culture under the criteria and values of usefulness and *reasonableness*. The delicate balance between control and trust will continue to be one of the critical breaking points for the success of these types of policies.

## BIBLIOGRAPHY

Arellano-Gault, David (2005), “*La transparencia desde la teoría de las organizaciones*” [Transparency in organization theory], in Merino, Mauricio.

*Transparencia: libros, autores e ideas*, [Transparency: books, authors and ideas]. Mexico: CIDE-IFAI.

Buchanan, James, (1986), *Liberty, market and the state*, Nueva Jersey: New York University Press

Crozier, Michael, (1964), *The bureaucratic phenomenon*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Crozier, Michael y Erhard, Friedberg (1989), *El actor y el sistema*, [The actor and the system]. Mexico: Alianza.

Downs, Anthony, (1967), *Inside bureaucracy*, Prospect Highs: Waveland Press.

Elster, Jon, (1979), *Ulysses and the Sirens. Studies in rationality and irrationality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Elster, Jon (1983), *Sour grapes. Studies in the subversion of rationality*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Fung, A. et al. 2007, *Full disclosure. The perils and promise of transparency*, Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Heald, David, (2006), Varieties of transparency. Hood, Christopher and David Heald ed. *Transparency: The key to better governance?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Menard, Claude, (2001), Methodological issues in New Institutional Economics. *Journal of Economic Methodology*. 8(1)

Niskanen, William, (1971), *Bureaucracy and representative government*, Chicago: Chicago University Press.

Roberts, Alasdair, (2006). Dashed expectations: governmental adaptation to transparency rules, Hood, Christopher and David Heald eds., *Transparency: The key to better governance?*, Oxford: Oxford University Press

Simon, Herbert (1947), *The administrative behavior*, Nueva York: Free Press.

Weber, Max (1974), *Economía y sociedad*. [Economy and Society]. Mexico: FCE.

Weick, Karl, (2000), *Making Sense of the organization*, Malden: Blackwell.

Wilsavsky, Aaron, (1993), *Speaking truth to power*. Nueva York: Transaction.  
Williamson, Oliver, (1991), *Mercados y jerarquías: su análisis y sus implicaciones antitrust*. [Markets and hierarchies: analysis and implications]. Mexico: FCE.

### \* **Biography**

David Arellano-Gault (Ph.D. University of Colorado) is a Professor at the Public Administration Division at CIDE (Center for Research and Teaching in Economics) in Mexico City. He has recently published "Maturation of Public Administration in a multicultural environment: lessons from the Anglo-Saxon. Latin and Scandinavian political traditions," *International Journal of Public Administration* 27 (7): 519-528. 2004, and Economic-NPM and the Need to Bring Justice and Equity Back to the Debate on Public Organizations forthcoming in *Administration & Society*. He is also editor of the academic journal *Gestión y Política Pública* (Public Management and Policy).